Is this the right starting point?
When to use it
Operators who need to know where they stand, what to fix first, and whether the security they have already bought is working.
What you receive
A recommended assessment type and standards mix, a ranked roadmap and spending path, and the evidence behind every priority.
What we start with
A conversation with one of our leaders about your site and the decision you need to make, and the basic inputs the GoSecure™ tool works from: vertical, plant location, risk and severity.
Working within your operation. Data collection uses OT-native cybersecurity solutions built for live production networks, agreed with operations and run under your change control.
Cybersecurity is never a one-off project. It is a lifecycle, and it needs an independent, honest and skilled partner working with the operator through every stage.
Then back to Assess, as the operation, the threat and the standards change.
Watch
One assessment methodology, three services.
Twenty-odd seconds on how a site's own characteristics decide the standards it is assessed against, and what each service looks for.
From the operator side
Engineers who have run the plants.
We are experts in the key cybersecurity and OT cybersecurity standards. Our team has more than 20 years of experience, with careers spanning automation and process control systems engineering and IT/OT cybersecurity. We have worked as operators with major global companies across oil and gas, power and utilities, chemicals, energy, manufacturing and petrochemicals, as well as in OEM leadership and consulting.
We know how the process runs, what a maintenance window costs, why a controller cannot simply be taken offline, and what a trip does to the unit downstream.
That is why every GoSecure™ finding is ranked by what it can do to the process, not by a severity score.
Three services
Three services under one assessment methodology.
Start with the one your decision needs. All three share the same scoping, the same site rules and the same handover, so adding a service adds evidence, not a second project.
- Service 01
Assess and Prioritize
Where do we stand, and where should the budget go?
Your exposure measured against the standards that govern your site, ranked by what it can do to the process, turned into a strategy and a spending path.
- Service 02
ControlPulse™
Is the security we already bought working?
Security controls effectiveness and compliance. Each tool followed from purchase to proof, then tuned so the investment pays back.
- Service 03
AKTAuthority™
Who can change the process?
Every actor, path and level of authority over a critical function, built from records you already hold.
Service 01 · Assess and Prioritize
Assessment should set the strategy and the spending path.
Every operator has the right to know where they stand, what to do next, how to move forward and where to put the budget. Too often we meet the opposite: organizations that are overspending but under-secure, or spending in the wrong direction.
That is why we treat assessment as the cornerstone of the program. Scoped right, executed right and delivered with the right outputs, it defines the strategy and the order in which money is spent.
How the engagement runs.
Meet one of our leaders
A conversation with an experienced InnovAKT leader to capture the basic information the next step needs: the site, the operation, the decision in front of you and the constraints around it.
The GoSecure™ tool sets the standards mix
From those basic inputs, the GoSecure™ tool recommends the assessment type and the mix of standards the engagement will follow, and generates the assessment guidance.
Inputs: vertical, plant location, severity and risk. Outputs: assessment type, standards, guidance.Agreement
Sites, systems, exclusions, deliverables, data handling and rules of engagement agreed in writing before any collection begins.
Data collection
Built for the running plant: OT-native cybersecurity solutions on the production network, configuration exports, documents, interviews and walkdowns under your permit. Collection methods are agreed with operations before anything is connected.
Findings are then validated with your team before anything is written, and delivered as a prioritized roadmap and an executive briefing.
Step 2 in practice: your site sets the standards.
No customer is assessed against every framework; mapping to standards that do not govern you adds pages and removes clarity. The inputs below are the ones the GoSecure™ tool works from. Try them to see how an indicative mix changes. The tool and a specialist confirm the mix for your site before the agreement.
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Vertical
The sector sets the sector regulation and the reference architecture. An electric utility, a water system, a pipeline, a refinery and a data center are governed differently and built differently.
- Electric utility
- Power generation
- Water and wastewater
- Oil, gas and chemicals
- Industrial manufacturing
- Critical facilities and building automation
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Plant location
Jurisdiction sets the statutory obligations. The same plant design carries different legal duties in North America, the European Union, the Gulf and the Caribbean.
- United States
- Canada
- European Union
- Saudi Arabia
- Elsewhere in the Gulf
- Caribbean
- Elsewhere
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Risk
The consequence the site can actually suffer: harm to people, an environmental release, loss of a public service, or loss of production and revenue. A safety instrumented system in the architecture brings the functional-safety interface into scope.
- Harm to people — SIS in the architecture
- Environmental release
- Loss of a public service
- Production and revenue
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Severity and criticality
How the site or asset is designated: national critical infrastructure, an essential service, a bulk electric system asset, or a commercial facility. Criticality sets the target security level and the depth of evidence required.
- Bulk electric system assetTarget security levels are set at the higher end for the functions that matter, and evidence is gathered to audit standard.
- Designated critical infrastructureTarget security levels are set at the higher end for the functions that matter, and evidence is gathered to audit standard.
- Essential serviceTarget security levels follow the consequence of each function; evidence is gathered to support a regulator's or insurer's review.
- Commercial facilityTarget security levels follow the consequence of each function; the depth of evidence is set by what leadership needs to decide.
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Compliance need
Who is asking, and for what: a regulator, an insurer, a customer contract, a parent company's certified management system, or leadership's own standard of care.
- A regulator
- An insurer
- A customer contract
- US defense supply chain
- A corporate ISMS
- Our own standard of care
Your indicative mix
Baseline
Sector
Jurisdiction
Safety interface
Management system
Contract
standards apply. in the catalog do not.
| Standard | Type | Brought into scope by |
|---|---|---|
| ISA/IEC 62443-3-2 — security risk assessment, zones, conduits, target security levels | Industrial baseline | Every OT assessment |
| ISA/IEC 62443-3-3 and 62443-2-1 — system requirements and the security program | Industrial baseline | Every OT assessment |
| NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3 — Guide to OT Security | Industrial guidance | Every OT assessment |
| MITRE ATT&CK for ICS — adversary techniques | Threat model, not a standard | Every OT assessment |
| NIST Cybersecurity Framework 2.0 | Reporting framework | Leadership that already reports in it, and US regulators and insurers |
| NERC CIP | Sector regulation | Electric utilities and generators registered in the North American bulk electric system |
| Risk and resilience assessment under America's Water Infrastructure Act, with AWWA guidance | Sector regulation and guidance | US community water systems |
| TSA pipeline security directives | Sector regulation | Designated US pipeline owners and operators |
| IEC 62351 — power system communication security | Sector standard | Utilities with substation and telecontrol communications |
| ISO/IEC 27019 — information security for energy utility process control | Sector standard | Energy utilities running an ISO/IEC 27001 program |
| NIS2 Directive | Jurisdiction | Essential and important entities in EU member states |
| Saudi NCA ECC and NCA OTCC | Jurisdiction | Operators in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia |
| Other GCC national requirements | Jurisdiction | Operators elsewhere in the Gulf — identified in scoping |
| IEC 61511 and ISA TR84.00.09 — safety instrumented systems and their cybersecurity | Functional-safety interface | Sites with a safety instrumented system; reviewed on paper, never tested live |
| ISO/IEC 27001 | Management system | A parent company or corporate ISMS that the OT environment must join |
| ISO 22301 — business continuity | Management system | Continuity obligations from a regulator, customer or parent company |
| CMMC | Contract requirement | Suppliers to the US defense industrial base |
| ISA/IEC 62443-2-4 — requirements for service providers | Contract requirement | Integrator and service-provider obligations written into contracts |
Applicability is confirmed in scoping against your actual obligations. We identify which standards apply and report against them; we do not make legal determinations. NIS2 does not apply in the Caribbean Netherlands or in Aruba, Curaçao and Sint Maarten; where an operator there chooses to align with it, that is recorded as a voluntary reference.
The recommended assessment type: five options, chosen by the decision you need to make.
| Type | The decision it supports | What you receive |
|---|---|---|
| Site baseline | Can we defend a number for next year?One representative site establishes method, effort and value before anything is committed at scale. | A ranked findings set and a defensible budget figure |
| Consequence-led risk assessment | What do we fix first, and why?Critical functions, zones and conduits, target security levels and reachability, to ISA/IEC 62443-3-2. | Operational risk register and prioritized roadmap |
| Regulatory readiness | What will the regulator expect to see, and can we show it?Evidence mapped against the regime that governs you. | Evidence map, gap list and a sequenced closure plan |
| Architecture and exposure review | What can actually reach what?OT-native network visibility and configuration review, including remote and third-party access. | Current-state architecture as observed and a reachability analysis |
| Multi-site maturity baseline | Where does each site stand, on one scale?People, process and technology scored the same way across an estate. | Comparable site baselines ready for quarterly re-measurement |
The two services below extend any of these: ControlPulse™ when the question is whether deployed controls work, AKTAuthority™ when it is who can act on the process.
Two orders of the same list
Vulnerability-first
- Unpatched historian at Level 3 — remote code executionNo path from L4Reporting onlyCVSS 9.8
- Legacy operating system on a standalone analyzer PCNo network pathAnalyzer onlyCVSS 9.1
- Firewall rule permitting any/any between L3 and L3.5Enterprise to controlWhole siteCVSS 8.6
- Flat VLAN shared between two production unitsUnit to unitBoth units at onceCVSS 7.5
- Engineering workstation joined to the enterprise domainL4 to L2 in one hopLogic downloadCVSS 6.5
- Vendor support tunnel terminating at Level 2, always onDirect to controllersProcess changeCVSS 5.3
- Shared operator account on the HMI, no expiryLocal consoleSetpoint changeCVSS 4.0
- Controller logic backups never restore-testedNot applicableRecovery timeCVSS 3.7
Consequence-first
- Firewall rule permitting any/any between L3 and L3.5Enterprise to controlWhole siteCVSS 8.6
- Vendor support tunnel terminating at Level 2, always onDirect to controllersProcess changeCVSS 5.3
- Engineering workstation joined to the enterprise domainL4 to L2 in one hopLogic downloadCVSS 6.5
- Flat VLAN shared between two production unitsUnit to unitBoth units at onceCVSS 7.5
- Shared operator account on the HMI, no expiryLocal consoleSetpoint changeCVSS 4.0
- Controller logic backups never restore-testedNot applicableRecovery timeCVSS 3.7
- Unpatched historian at Level 3 — remote code executionNo path from L4Reporting onlyCVSS 9.8
- Legacy operating system on a standalone analyzer PCNo network pathAnalyzer onlyCVSS 9.1
An illustrative finding set, not a customer's. The same eight items, ranked two ways. Nothing on the network is critical until the process says it is.
Six areas of work, in this order.
The order is deliberate. Consequence has to be understood before exposure means anything, and exposure has to be proven before a priority can be defended.
Operational consequence analysis
We begin with the process, not the network. Which functions must keep running, what a safe state looks like, what the operational and safety consequence is if each is lost or manipulated, and how long the operation can tolerate that loss. This is done with engineering and operations, not derived from documentation.
Architecture and zone review
Current network and system architecture assessed against ISA/IEC 62443 zone and conduit principles and Purdue-model separation. We document what the architecture is, not what the drawing says it is — the difference between the two is frequently the most useful finding of the engagement.
Asset and dependency visibility
Control systems, engineering workstations, historians, network infrastructure and safety-adjacent equipment identified with OT-native discovery on the production network and configuration review. Assets are ordered by the operational function they support, because an inventory not ranked by consequence cannot drive a priority.
Exposure and reachability
Firewall rule sets, routing, remote access paths, wireless, portable media practice and IT/OT interconnection analyzed to establish what can actually reach what. Reachability is proven from configuration and OT-native visibility of the production network. Every path we report is evidenced, and any active confirmation of a route runs under rules of engagement agreed with operations.
Third-party and remote access
Vendor, integrator and OEM access reviewed end to end: who holds it, through what route, with what privilege, under whose approval, and whether it is revoked when an engagement ends. In multi-site estates this is consistently among the highest-consequence and lowest-visibility exposures we find.
Prioritized remediation sequence
Findings converted into an ordered plan: what to do first, why that order, what each item depends on, what it will disrupt, who owns it, and what level of effort it represents. Written so it can be taken to a budget conversation without translation, and tendered competitively without rewriting.
Nothing on the network is critical until the process says it is.
What you receive.
Assessment type and standards applicability
Which standards apply and why, from the GoSecure™ inputs, with the assessment guidance.
Operational risk register
Findings tied to the function, the consequence and the evidence, with architecture and exposure findings.
Prioritized roadmap and spending path
What to do first, why that order, what it depends on, who owns it and the effort it represents.
Executive briefing
The decisions leadership has to take, written so they can go to a budget conversation without translation.
Service 02 · ControlPulse™ · controls effectiveness and compliance
Make the security you have already bought pay back.
Most industrial operators have already invested in OT security: firewalls at the boundary, network monitoring and intrusion detection, a SIEM, backup systems, a remote access platform, endpoint allow-listing. ControlPulse™ answers the question the invoice cannot. Is each of them doing the job it was bought to do, and what would it take to get the full value out of it?
A tool that is deployed but not tuned is worse than an honest gap, because the organization believes it is protected. The work is rarely buying more. It is configuring, integrating and proving what is already there.
Four gates between an invoice and a working control.
Purchased
The tool is licensed and installed.
Configured as intended
Its policy, coverage and rules match what the design says it should do, not what commissioning left behind.
Operating
It is observed working in the plant as it is today: sensors see the conduits that matter, alerts reach a named person, jobs complete.
Proven
It has done its job under a controlled test, inside an agreed window, off the running process wherever possible, with operations holding stop authority.
Most control failures we find are not missing products. They are a gate that was never closed.
Where each investment usually stops paying back.
Illustrative patterns from industrial estates, not a customer's results. Select a tool.
| Tool | Usually stops at | Why | What ControlPulse™ does |
|---|---|---|---|
| Boundary firewalls | Configured as intended | Exceptions accumulated across projects and turnarounds; broad rules left because nobody could say what they carry. | Rebuild each rule's intent, retire unowned rules under change control, and confirm what the boundary actually enforces. |
| OT network monitoring and intrusion detection | Operating | Sensors do not see every critical conduit; the baseline dates from commissioning; alerts land in a console nobody watches at night. | Verify coverage conduit by conduit, re-baseline to the plant as it is, tune detection to the process, and route alerts to a named person. |
| SIEM and log collection | Configured as intended | OT sources never onboarded or parsed, and events arrive without the industrial context needed to act. | Onboard and parse the OT sources, add asset and zone context, and write correlation for the scenarios your process can actually suffer. |
| Backup and recovery | Operating | Jobs complete successfully and nobody has restored a controller or an engineering workstation from them. | Exercise restoration on bench or spare equipment in an agreed window and record how long recovery actually takes. |
| Remote access platform | Configured as intended | The platform is in place, but a vendor still uses an older direct route, recording is off, or approvals never expire. | Close the parallel routes, enforce recording and named accounts, and make approvals time-bound. |
| Endpoint protection and allow-listing | Configured as intended | Installed in audit mode and left there, because enforcement was never agreed with the system vendor. | Plan the move to enforcement asset class by asset class, with vendor approval, testing and a rollback. |
What you receive.
Effectiveness ledger
Each tool: purchased, configured, operating, proven.
Verification evidence pack
The configuration, coverage and test evidence behind each result.
Assurance statement
What was verified, and what was not, stated plainly.
Tuning and optimization plan
The ordered work that gets the full value out of what you own.
Scope, test rules, method and the full engagement process are on the ControlPulse™ page.
ControlPulse™ service detailsService 03 · AKTAuthority™ · who can change the process
Who and what can change the process, through which path, with what authority.
Asset inventories say what exists. Network maps say what communicates. Neither says who can change the physical process. AKTAuthority™ maps, for each critical function, every actor, the path they use, the level of authority they hold and the physical effect they can cause.
Network reachability is not control authority.
Four actors, traced to what they can physically do.
An illustrative graph, not a customer's estate. Note how many arrive at Configure without anyone having decided to grant it.
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WhoShift operatorHowOperator console on the supervisory networkAuthorityCommandPhysical effectChange a setpoint within configured limits.
Intended.
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WhoIntegrator engineerHowEngineering workstation through the site jump hostAuthorityConfigurePhysical effectChange controller logic and interlock settings.
Intended, for the project.
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WhoOEM remote supportHowVendor remote session to the engineering workstation, using a subcontractor's shared credentialAuthorityConfigurePhysical effectDownload logic to a controller.
Transitive: nobody granted the subcontractor anything.
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WhoAnalytics service accountHowOPC UA write scope added during an upgradeAuthorityCommand (previously Observe)Physical effectChange a setpoint.
No management-of-change record. Invisible to the network map and the asset inventory.
Six levels, because access lists only have one.
- Observe
- Can read process values, alarms or engineering data. Cannot change anything — but can see enough to plan, and can leak what the process is doing.
- Recommend
- Can produce an output a human or a system will act on. An optimization model, an advisory application, an analytics platform. The authority is real but borrowed.
- Command
- Can change a setpoint or start and stop equipment within the limits the configuration already allows. The normal authority of an operating console.
- Configure
- Can change what the limits are — logic, ranges, interlocks, alarm settings, I/O assignment. This is the level most vendor and engineering access actually sits at.
- Override
- Can force a value, defeat an interlock or place a loop in manual against the process state. Frequently available from more places than anyone expects.
- Inhibit
- Can suppress or bypass a protective function. The highest level on the scale, the smallest population, and usually the least logged.
Industrial AI follows the same scale. A model reading the historian sits at Observe. Its advice to an operator is Recommend. The day it writes through an API to a control application, it holds Command. The project did not change its name; its authority did.
What you receive.
Process authority graph
Built from records you already hold, OT-native data from the production network where it adds evidence, and confirmation by walkdown.
Unintended authority register
Transitive, undocumented and drifted authority, ranked by physical effect.
Authority model and decision rights
Who should hold which level over each critical function.
Snapshot baseline
The reference that later drift reviews are measured against.
The records we work from, the questions the graph answers and the engagement process are on the AKTAuthority™ page.
AKTAuthority™ service detailsHow we work on site
Built to run on a live plant.
These are the working rules we write into every statement of work. The agreed scope and rules of engagement for your site govern.
OT-native by design
Data collection uses OT-native cybersecurity solutions built for production networks: protocol-aware, suited to industrial systems, and deployed at a pace agreed with operations.
Your change control
Every connection, query and change is agreed with operations and runs through your change control and maintenance windows, with vendor agreements checked first.
Safety systems out of scope
The SIS is reviewed on paper, never interrogated live and never a test target.
Deeper testing by agreement
Where you need active verification, it runs under written rules of engagement, in an agreed window, with a named abort authority on your side.
Recovery exercised off the running process
Restoration is proven on spare or bench equipment, never on a controller mid-run.
Your escort, your permit
Site access under your permit-to-work and supervision processes.
Findings shown before they are written
Validated with your team before anything reaches leadership.
Fit
Where GoSecure™ fits, and where to start instead.
Use GoSecure™ when
- You are being asked for an OT cybersecurity budget and cannot yet defend a number.
- A regulator, insurer, auditor or customer has asked for evidence of operational risk assessment.
- Security tools are deployed and nobody can evidence what they cover or whether they work.
- A board or insurer has asked who is able to change the process, and the answer is a shrug.
- Vendor, integrator or OEM access has grown through projects and nobody owns the total picture.
- You are introducing analytics or AI into operations and need to bound what they can cause.
- You have acquired or inherited sites whose architecture nobody currently understands.
Start with another service when
- You already hold a credible, current assessment. Start at remediation instead — see AKTSecure™.
- An incident is in progress. Email info@innovakt.com with “OT incident” in the subject rather than using the form. We confirm quickly how we can support, working under your operational authority, and the assessment follows once the plant is stable.
- What you need is continuous coverage rather than a point-in-time answer — see InnovAKT Shield™.
- What you need first is decision authority, ownership or the board case for funding — see AKTElevate™.
Framework alignment
Mapped once. Reported against whatever governs you.
GoSecure™ is structured primarily around ISA/IEC 62443 — zones, conduits, security levels and capability requirements — because that is the vocabulary industrial engineering and industrial vendors already share.
NIST SP 800-82 Rev. 3, the Guide to Operational Technology Security, frames each service:
- Assess and Prioritize — risk framing and assessment for OT (§4.1.1, §4.1.2), the threat and vulnerability taxonomy (Appendix C), and the passive and active discovery methods for OT (Appendix E.2.2 and E.2.3) that set how OT-native collection is applied on each segment.
- ControlPulse™ — the assess step of the risk management framework applied to OT (§4.3.5) and network monitoring capabilities (Appendix E.2), with MITRE ATT&CK for ICS structuring technique coverage.
- AKTAuthority™ — identity management and access control for OT (§6.2.1), the longest section of its Protect guidance, and remote access (Appendix E.3.6).
Findings are then expressed against whichever additional standards the five factors bring into scope. Compliance alignment is a reporting output of this engagement, not its objective. We describe our work as aligned with these documents; NIST SP 800-82 is guidance, not a certifiable standard.
Outcomes
What is different in the organization afterwards.
A defensible priority
A remediation order tied to operational consequence, justified to a board, a regulator or an insurer with reasoning rather than assertion.
Evidence in place of assumption
A per-tool statement of what you paid for, what is switched on, what is working and what is proven.
An answer to “who can change the process?”
A named list of who and what can cause each consequential physical action, with the path and the level.
Spend directed, not increased
Frequently the output redirects planned spend rather than adding to it, because configuration and sequence turn out to matter more than additional capability.
Questions we are actually asked
What gets asked before anyone agrees to site access.
How do you collect data on a live production network?
With OT-native cybersecurity solutions built for it: sensors and collectors that understand industrial protocols, connected at span or tap points and, where agreed, querying devices in their own native protocol rather than with generic IT tools, never protection relays, safety systems or devices on low-bandwidth telemetry links. Configuration exports, documentation review and walkdowns under your escort complete the picture.
Every method is agreed with operations in scoping, connected through your change control and paced to the segment it runs on. Safety systems stay out of scope. Where you need deeper verification of a specific control or route, it runs as a ControlPulse™ engagement with written rules of engagement, an agreed window and a named abort authority.
We already have an assessment from someone else.
Then we build on it rather than repeat it. Send it to us before the scoping call. If it establishes operational consequence, evidences reachability and gives you a defensible order of work, we will tell you to start at execution rather than repeat an assessment you have already paid for.
What we look for is specific: does it rank anything by what happens to the process, or is it an asset list with vulnerability severities attached? The second is common, and it is not a priority. It is a length.
How is this different from what our IT security team does?
Your IT security team almost certainly assesses against enterprise controls, patch position and known vulnerability exposure. That work is necessary and this does not replace it. The starting point is different: we begin from the physical process and what its loss or manipulation would mean, then work outward to the systems and paths that could cause it.
The practical difference shows up in the output. A vulnerability with no reachable path to a consequential function ranks below a documented vendor route into a control zone that nobody reviews. That ordering is difficult to produce from an enterprise toolset, because the toolset has no view of the process.
What happens if you find something serious mid-engagement?
You hear it the day we find it, through a contact route agreed in scoping, not in a report six weeks later. The scoping document names who we call and who they may escalate to before any site work begins.
We act on it with you, not around you. You get the observation, the evidence and the options with their operational impact attached, and, where your scoping document authorizes it, our engineers can carry out the option you choose: closing a path, disabling an account or changing a rule. Your team raises the change and issues the credentials for it, and the change is recorded in the findings so the assessed state stays traceable. Operations holds the decision, because a well-intentioned action taken outside that authority during production is how assessments cause incidents.
What if you find that the controls we just paid for do not work?
That is a common outcome rather than an unlikely one, and it is usually drift rather than a supplier failing. A control commissioned correctly two years ago will have been touched by a switch replacement, a patch cycle, a vendor visit and a turnaround since.
We report it with the configuration evidence attached, and we do not soften it, because a verification you can argue with in a boardroom is not a verification. Findings are written so the party who built the control can act on them rather than defend against them, which matters when that party is still under contract with you.
We already bought the tools. Why would we pay to assess them?
Because an invoice records that a tool was bought, not that it works. Configuration drifts, sensors stop seeing a segment after a switch replacement, alerts reach a console nobody watches at night, and backups complete without ever being restored. ControlPulse™ tells you which of your tools are delivering and gives you the ordered tuning work to close the rest. The usual outcome is getting more from what you own, not buying more.
Next step
Start with one site, one tool, or one critical function.
A single representative scope establishes method, effort and value before anything is committed across the estate.
- Scope and exclusions in writing — before any site access is arranged
- OT-native data collection — solutions built for production networks, run under your change control
- Vendor-neutral output — we resell no products and take no referral fees
- Findings validated with your team — before they reach your executives
Or discuss one service on its own: Assess and Prioritize · ControlPulse™ · AKTAuthority™
Questions buyers ask
What we are asked before we start.
What is GoSecure™?
GoSecure™ is InnovAKT's OT cybersecurity assessment methodology. It establishes what is installed and connected, how it is exposed, and what a cyber event would do to the physical process, then turns that into a ranked, sequenced strategy and spending path a plant can execute. Three services sit under it: Assess and Prioritize, ControlPulse™ for the effectiveness of security controls already deployed, and AKTAuthority™ for who can change the process.
How does a GoSecure™ engagement start?
With a conversation with one of our leaders to capture the basic information about your site and the decision you need to make. The GoSecure™ tool then uses a few basic inputs, including vertical, plant location, severity and risk, to recommend the assessment type and the mix of standards, and generates the assessment guidance. Scope is agreed in writing, and data collection uses OT-native cybersecurity solutions built for production networks.
Can a GoSecure™ OT risk assessment run on a live plant?
Yes. GoSecure™ is designed for running plants. Data collection uses OT-native cybersecurity solutions built for production networks, alongside configuration and document review, interviews and agreed site walkdowns, all run under your change control. Where deeper verification of live controls is needed, it is scoped and authorized with written rules of engagement, approved timing and operational stop authority.
How is GoSecure™ different from a standard vulnerability assessment?
A vulnerability assessment tells you which software is out of date. GoSecure™ tells you which of those facts can change the behavior of the process, in what order they should be addressed, what each will cost, and who should own it. It is graded against IEC 62443 and the NIST Cybersecurity Framework, but the ranking is operational.
Which standards will a GoSecure™ assessment use?
The ones that govern you, and no others. The GoSecure™ tool works from the site's vertical, plant location, severity and risk, including who is asking for evidence, and recommends the mix; a specialist confirms it with you before any work begins. ISA/IEC 62443 and NIST SP 800-82 frame every assessment; sector and jurisdiction requirements are added only where they apply. We identify applicability; we do not make legal determinations.
What is ControlPulse™?
ControlPulse™ is a scoped OT security control validation engagement. It verifies whether the controls already in place perform as intended and produces recorded evidence, a clear statement of what was and was not verified, and prioritized corrective actions. It is delivered as a service under GoSecure™, with full details on the ControlPulse™ page; continuous managed coverage is provided through InnovAKT Shield™.
Does ControlPulse™ provide continuous OT monitoring?
ControlPulse™ checks monitoring coverage, detection logic and escalation as a verification engagement. Continuous OT monitoring is delivered through InnovAKT Shield™, and the ControlPulse™ findings become its starting baseline.
What is AKTAuthority™?
AKTAuthority™ is InnovAKT's review of who and what holds authority over an industrial control estate: identity, privileged access, remote access, vendor and third-party connections, and the engineering workstations from which changes are actually made. It answers a question most organizations cannot answer confidently — who can change the process, from where, and who approved it.